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iN TI-L;: SUPREME COURT

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

---------)
)
Plaintiff and Resp)ndent, )

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

vs.

No. 9851

)
)
)
Defend ant and Appellant. )

TF {RY D. LOUDl...::N,

APPELLAN~t"~;

R ;:PLY BRIEF

_______ ______
,_.

AR G lJ -A ENT
POINT l

~\

THE ORAL STATEMENT ADMITTED WAS AS TO
CONFE~3SION NOT MERELY AN AD:NiLSSION.
Respondent in its brief at page 6 cites the case of

State v. }11asato Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126 P. 2d 1047
(1942) in support of the proposition that the oral
statement admitted into evidence, which appellant
claims as error in Point 1 of his brief, was not a
confession as claimed by appellant but rather merely
an ad1nission.

The Karumai case does not support
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seems holds at most

that no prelin1inary showing of voluntariness is
necessary before admitting an admission into
evidence, where the admission is not too comprehensive.

Further, the court held that there was no

showing that the statement was involuntarily made
and thus the conclusion that the statcm ent was an
admission was not necessary to the decision of
that case.
In the present case, even assuming the statement to be an adn1ission, it is much too comprehensive to be governed by the Karumai case.
Further, the Karumai case was decided before the
case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P, 2d 178

(1943). The Karumai case appears to have only
considered the rule that the state need only
E:stablish, fl'itna facie case of VOluntariness,
That Crank case however imposes the obligation
upon the court to consider all evidence of voluntariness before a confession is adn1itted. Although
the Crank case does not specifically say that this
new rule shall also apply to adn1is sions, the rc asoning
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-3be1dnd it clearly dictates that it should apply to a
statement like the one in the pres m t case.
The alleged statement in question (R. 79) specifically admits every element of second degree
burglary, except it doesn't contain the statement
that defend;.:.Llt intended to corn mit 1 arc eny or a
felony when he entered the bui.lding. However, the
statement clearly implies thJ.t element and is consistent only with that conclusion. It is thus a confession.

But even assu1.ning i:h ,_t lack of express words

of intent renders the state.rr:ent an admission, it must
be treated like a confessic •- under the reasoning of
the Crank case.

Otherwise, even torture could be

nsed upon a r1efendant up to the point where he admit ted all elements, but one, and that element one
which can legally be implied or inferred. See
State v. Hopkins ll Utah 2d 3 63, 359 P 2d 48 6 (19 61).
Further, defendant in an out of court hear:lng
may be able to establish that he in fact did confess
to the r.nissing element, thus bringing the alleged
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stat

---- the rule of the Crank

case a .d then further establish that the ·whole
confession we1.s i11V0luntary.

To require defendant

to establish before a jury that his confession was
complete in order Lo show that it was not an admiss ion, would r eq uir e defend ant to prosecute him s c lf.
POINT 2
/.STATEMENT OF COUNSEL IS NOT THE
EQUIVALENT OF AN OUT OF COURT HEARING.
Respoi1dent in Point 1. B. of its brief raises
the rat11er startling point that since c_:ppellant,s
attorney indicated to the c-ouTt what the testimony
would be at the out of court hearing on the question
of voluEtariness and that t:he couTt then deter1nined
submi~

to
h2.;

the evidence to the jury,

t~1.at

appellant

had all he is entitled to. If this is the law,

then in effect it allows the court to say that he
would r. A believe appellant if he
1night e1.s \Jell not '·"aste ti.n1e.

tes~.ified,

so he

This is not the law.

Under the rule of the Crank case, supra, the trial
judge is required to deterrninc for hirnsel£ whether
or not he be lievc s the confession to be voluntary .
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.: !l t}

urt says:

-·5"'.L'his does not mean merely a prima facie
showing but rr1ust satisfy the mind of the court
iil the Fght of ,1.ll the evi·lence giv,:::n by b: .th
state a 1.d cbC~nse.''
Although the Crank caso says the court decides
the question as a matter of ~.aT,'~', the court is nevertheless to exercise its honest judgment as to whether
the court finds the confession to be voluntary and
not whether it finds that sorr1e one else could reasonably find it to be voluntary, otherwise a "prima
facie showing" would be enongh bee a use by_ definition it means enough evidence to sustain a finding
of voluntariness.
POINT 3
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE COURT'S
PHOCEDURE WITH REGARD TO THE ALLEGED
CONFESSION WAS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR.
Respondent in Poirtl. C. of its brief raises the
point that appellant was not sufficiently clear, at page
72 of the record, that he was objecting to the court's
procedure with regard to the alleged confession. It
is subinitted that a fair analysis of the transcript
indicate
•.> that appellant v1 as o bj ec ting to the court's
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·-::-:-::-:::==-,:~::..

,;sian and the search

and seizure question.
POINT 4
A MOTEL 11ANAGER DOES NOT HAVE
AUTHORITY TO AUTHORIZE A SEARCH OF
A 110TEL R0011 WHICH HAS BEEN RENTED
TO TENANTS.
Respondent, at page 12 of its brief, cites Varon,
Searches and Seizt:tres, Vol. l, p.439 (1961) as authority
for its appcarent position that the motel manager
was authorized to allow the search. At page 441 of
the sarne volu

.~.-;e

it is said:

"An in-nkeeper or person running a rooming
house or hotel certainly has the right to invite a
police officer upon the pre1nises, but does not
have the right to pernd~ the police officeJSto
enter upo-r1 the roc1n or premises which may be
leased to a hotel guest, roomer or patron. By
so doing, the roo1ning house owner or hotel
D1Rnager or innkeeper in effect waives the personal constil:utional rights o{ f!1e hotel guest,
roomer or patron against unreasonable search
and seizure.''
Thus, to hold that a rnotel Lnanager has given valid
clutb:-'• 'ty to consent to a f.c<>.l~ch is to hold that the

tenants have waived their ''·pe rs anal constitutionn]
rights".

Waiver is an affirmative defense \vhich

must be pleaded and proved. Likc ..1ise, in a crin1inal
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cas<

.

on a waiver, it.

1should have the dut; of proving a waiver. Appellant
is not :_;eeking affirrnative relief in the sense of
tryinr; to obtain the return of the property.

The

unlawful search and seizn ,:e was established
unless there was a waiver.
E~;

The State must prove

case and must prove a waiver if it claims such,

and all of the ele1nents thereof, including knowledge.
The admission of the St .te's exhibits w:1s highly
prej _tdicial to defendant, especially admission of
the pistol because of the serial number.

CONCLUSION
Thus despite new

n1

aterial raised by respondent

in its brief, it clearly appears that prejudicial error
was committed, and the conviction and sentence of
the trial court should be reversed.
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